Modern sugar production from sugar beet owes its origins in the Prussian Empire of 1801 which saw the first beet sugar factory opened in Kunern (now called Konary, in Poland) . Its development was driven by a desire to secure a sugar supply that avoided the colonies of the British Empire and its navy. Its importance to world sugar production grew and by 1840 it accounted for approximately 5% of world sugar production mostly in France and Germany by location. By 1880 half the world’s production of sugar was from beet with it introduced to both the North and South American continents.
Throughout the industrial age sugar has been consumed on an increasing scale. However, because production costs are high, whether from cane or beet, sugar production can be greatly damaged by demand volatility risking a collapse of the sugar market. It was feared in Western countries from the 1890’s onwards that an interception of sugar supply could result in political unrest. At the same time farmers and sugar factory owners need a stable market to support ongoing growing of a high input crop and its expensive processing and capital costs.
Britain initially felt it was above this risk as it largely controlled its sugar supply throughout its Empire. Increase sugar consumption and the development of beet sugar ran a coach and horses through this security by the end of the nineteenth century. I believe this was a significant aspect in the erosion of the British Empire.
In 1862, when Mr. Gladstone was Chancellor of the Exchequer, a conference was called, on the invitation of France to consider the question of sugar bounties. To that conference France, England, Belgium and Holland were parties; and it resulted in a Convention which was never given effect to, but respecting which the opinion of Gladstone is recorded. The object of the Convention was to equalise the duty on sugar and the drawback given on the export of sugar so as to destroy any advantage or bounty given to the exporter. In 1866 Mr. Gladstone declared, “that was a very beneficial arrangement in the interests of the consumer, the importer, and the refiner alike.”
In this we see an acknowledgement of free trade as a tool to produce stability in the sugar market, albeit creating a tool to negate subsidy with countervailing duties. It has to be noted in 1866 that those attending the conference are the old colonial powers of Europe.
Beet sugar changed this relationship as Germany and Austria grew their production and control of sugar at a subsidized price was being weaponised economically. By the 1880’s the refineries of the British Empire found themselves in competition with foreign subsidised sugar refineries with the long purse of their governments behind them.
This was a direct economic challenge to the British Empire for in places like the West Indies the collapse of the sugar market risked the collapse of government. A Royal Commission of 1897 identified and gave in detail the devastating consequences of this. Effectively sugar was being dumped onto the market especially by Germany and Austria as net exporters of sugar. Such actions are a hostile act that can be just as damaging as any act of war. The price advantage held by these countries was deemed between 4s. and 5s. per cwt. America was growing at a massive pace, the rest of the world was increasing sugar production. 1902 saw the Brussels Sugar Convention again advocate free trade, that is, unsubsidised sugar production and countervailing duties.
Colonial sugar production had already dropped and Britain actually needed sugar imports. Australia increased sugar production[i] , but much was needed from outside the Empire and British politicians felt vulnerable and as we entered the twentieth century there was a growing movement to encourage the development of a British sugar beet industry.
The problem was that to start the British sugar beet industry from scratch needed large investment in plant, machinery and people to process it and commitment from farmers to grow it. In 1911 the Earl of Denbeigh summed up the problem, “The chief difficulty in introducing the culture of sugar beet in England is the necessity for jumping right away into an expenditure of some hundreds of thousands of pounds.” He proposed that the government should purchase a tract of some 5000 acres of suitable land having a good factory site on or adjacent to it and lease the lot on easy terms to an approved company to pump-prime the industry.
1911 saw significant growing trials of sugar beet in 23 counties with the top two for yield and sugar content in these trials being Suffolk and Lincolnshire:
Suffolk 13 tons/acre 19.1% sugar
Lincolnshire 15.5 tons /acre 16.9% sugar.
By comparison around 2020 sees averages of 33.5 tons and 19% sugar.
These trials are significant in that they dictated where it was attractive to invest in sugar beet factories and target the growing of the crop largely in Lincolnshire, Norfolk and Suffolk – in 2023 the last bastions of the crop being processed in Bury St Edmunds, Cantley, Newark and Wissington. [ii]
Pre-World War One two thirds of Britain’s annual imports of sugar were from Germany and Austria-Hungary. From the 1880’s onwards there were growing warnings about the reliance upon imports for key commodities, especially food. One of the key pressure groups of the day was the Navy League – at that time a collection of people of political and military background that promoted the desire for a strong navy to protect and enforce British interests at home and abroad (this organisation changed considerably after the First World War). The pressure from this group helped establish a Royal Commission on the Supply of Food and Raw Materials in Time of War in 1903 which reported to Parliament in 1905 that Britain was not only reliant upon imports for key raw materials but also food. Indeed it estimated Britain had a supply of only seven weeks wheat. However, overall the report felt that the lines of supply were strong enough and the ability of the Navy sufficient to protect supplies. This was greatly disputed by the Navy League and others with the report considered a white-wash by many politicians and journalists. Indeed, some of the Commissioners rebelled against the report and the “feeble conclusions arrived at by the majority of members.” The Navy League feared that if the government continued not to address the problem of ensuring food supply in the event of War the collapse of government and a revolution was a real risk by 1911.
In the meantime Germany was making preparations to interrupt and weaponize food supply using naval power above and below the waves, and economic power combined with technology such as sugar supply. The ability to disrupt wheat and petrol supply from Russia to Britain was key in their strategy.
By 1914 it was estimated that British food supply was reliant upon nearly 75% of its wheat being imported. Sugar supply at that time was reliant upon 72% of imports largely from Germany!
In this pre-War period many could see the benefits of Britain producing its own sugar but there were considerable barriers. Farmers were reluctant to commit land, resources and labour to this new crop. Equally, investors in sugar beet factories needed a firm commitment from farmers to ensure any new plant was operating at or near its capacity to ensure financial viability.
This was seen in 1909 as the Lincolnshire Beet Sugar Company Limited issued a prospectus to raise £130,000 capital in £1 shares for the Company to erect a sugar factory at Sleaford. A key investor in this sugar factory was The Sugar Beet Growers Syndicate of England Ltd, but in a classic ‘chicken and egg’ situation the Syndicate required a five year commitment of 3000 acres in the region for the factory site to warrant the investment. 250 Lincolnshire farmers undertook to grow sugar beet on a total of 2500 acres. Of the £130,000 share issue only £64,000 was subscribed and the Sleaford sugar beet factory project died a death. The failure of government to assist the sugar beet industry was challenged in the House of Lords with a claim that Britain consumed 88lb of sugar per head of population each year! Many modern estimates of sugar consumption are below this being estimated as around 60lbs per head a year in 2022, although figures vary.
In this pre-War period Dutch and French investors could see the benefits of investing in British sugar beet production and the Dutch influence was to be key after the War.
It took the deprivations of the First World War to change the fortunes of the development of the British sugar industry. The councillors of Spalding Urban District Council worked hard to ensure Spalding procured its own Sugar Beet Factory and in doing so ensured the future development of Spalding, once a port town, then a market town, to develop into a centre for the food industry. The local authority of that time was run by businessmen of vision that were prepared to act in a timely manner and at pace to remove any obstacles to this development. In addition they sold the benefits to both the local population and farmers of the area.
Several sites for the proposed sugar beet factory were explored at the same time in 1924. A site in Cowbit Road was rejected due to the nature of the clay sub-soil on the site as some of the machinery would exert 1 ½ tons per square foot pressure.
The site of West Marsh Road was decided upon and Spalding Urban District Council ensured that infrastructure was to be laid on to this new development. They procured the co-operation of the Deeping Fen Drainage Trustees in controlling the level of the Vernatts Drain to assure assistance in maintaining water supply and the River Welland Board co-operated in approving the proposed discharge of waste water. The town corporation laid on a 6 inch main to the new site. Similarly the gas mains was extended to the site and electricity also laid on. The roads at Albion Street and Marsh Rails were widened and improved to service the new factory site. In addition the town built its first by-pass or relief road to alleviate possible traffic congestion in the form of West Elloe Avenue.
By March 1925 a specialist large digger had been assembled on the site to dig out the pits and footings for the new site.
I find it very hard to imagine that current bureaucracy or ability of local authorities to act at pace to capture new industry could be achieved a hundred years later, such is progress.
The growth and production of sugar by many companies was problematic. Government subsidies were issued to encourage farmers to commit to growing sugar beet. However, the sugar companies wished to keep their payments to farmers as low as possible. The problem was made worse by American overproduction of sugar as they sought to dominate the supply of the Americas and the whole of Europe at the expense of European and Commonwealth sugar production. Sugar was aggressively grown with government subsidies, deep pockets of investors and poor treatment of growers being tools used in a trade war in sugar that sought global dominance. In November 1930 the global price for raw sugar was £5 7s. 6d. per ton. Cuba had production ramped up by American investors to produce a fifth of the world’s supply. Most of the factories in Cuba could not produce sugar at less than £9 6s. 8d. In contrast the cost of production in Britain was £25 10s. per ton.[iii] The price of sugar in Britain was kept artificially high by duties and levies at £18 10s. per ton plus the government paid a subsidy of £18 10s.per ton. 1931 would see the subsidy drop to £11 10s. per ton. 1930 had seen profits made as can be seen in the following report, but this was an artificial profit and not sustainable:
“South Lincolnshire farmers anxiously await the result of the negotiations between the Farmers’ Union and the Sugar Factories Committee with regard to the price to be paid for next year’s beet crop.
The reduction of 6s. 6d. per cwt. In the subsidy equivalent to 19s. 6d. per ton of beet, if equally shared between growers and factories, would bring the price paid to the farmer down from 51s. 10d. to 42s.
Last year all the factories made profits – the Anglo-Scottish Beet Sugar Corporations’ factories at Spalding and Colwick together yielded a profit of £117,518 compared with other companies £32,537 at Peterborough, £45,000 at Kings Lynn, £56,250 at Ely, and £115,172 at Bury.
Considering the low price of sugar during the year, the factories record is extremely satisfactory. Considering these profits have been made with the aid of state subsidy, the farmers may well argue that the factories should bear a substantial part of any sacrifice made necessary by the coming reduction in the subsidy.
This year’s acreage also is nearly 50 per cent greater than last year, and it may be assumed that on this bigger turnover the factories will be able to produce sugar at a lower average cost.
On the other hand, the steady improvement in methods of production should greatly increase yields to the farmer, and enable him to accept an offer of 40s. or 42s. a ton – a figure he would have ruled out impossible a year ago – and which is still uncomfortably near the cost of production.”[iv]
American business was trying to exploit its position of dominance that had been accelerated by the First World War, but the exploitation and deprivations of people risked unrest and revolution that was becoming an increasing fear to American, European and colonial interests as it looked towards Russia. 1930 saw instability in Cuba, peasant farmers on plantations and in British colonies were destitute and reliant upon aid where it was given. By 1932 massive price instability made rational planning and investment in sugar production, a capital intensive process, almost impossible. Britain was faced with a stark choice of protecting its home grown industry and its colonies or seeing them collapse. With memories of the First World War in people’s minds there was a genuine political fear that lack of key commodities, combined with unemployment could risk revolution in Britain. It is a sad fact that when peoples’ basic needs are not being met and they are perceived not to be listened to they become attracted to extreme groups – at this time the two extreme socialisms of fascism and communism.
Franklin D. Roosevelt recognised these risks and led the World Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933 that shaped the sugar industry to such an extent that, in my opinion, it influences the industry in Britain to this day. Tariffs and protectionism had failed to protect sugar production. Indeed, it had brought it to its knees. This conference started the process of replacing protectionism by uses of tariffs with global quotas. The quotas were above production levels and still made British sugar beet production reliant upon subsidies without which the production would be unviable. To protect supply in an uncertain world 1936 saw the nationalisation of the British Sugar Industry, without which it would almost certainly have collapsed.
Farmers did not necessarily feel better off as they repeatedly argued that cost of production was barely covered by contract price. However, 1937 saw an increase in contract price fuelled by fears of losing imports of sugar in the event of war.
Spalding retained its sugar beet factory and this had a significant economic and social effect to the town and surrounding area. It also had a significant agricultural effect as sugar beet was a staple “break crop” between growing cereals.
As a social asset it provided jobs seasonally directly and indirectly through the supporting businesses. It had its own social club, sports teams and facilities which would have had limited availability in the area if it was not for the factory. Most notable of the sports were archery and shooting, alongside field sports. It also provided training facilities for both locals and foreigners.
The benefit to local agriculture goes without saying. Having a local sugar beet factory meant that even quite small farmers could benefit from having a quota to grow sugar beet. Sugar beet growing transformed the types of crops being grown and the rotations used in the area. In my opinion it possibly hastened the reduction of mixed farming and cattle in the fens in the post-World War Two period. It should be noted that since its closure in 1989 livestock numbers and mixed farming has increased in the local fens, although regenerative practises may also be a factor. Nowadays the growing of sugar beet is not a viable proposition for the smaller farmer. Indeed it has to be either grown at scale by independent farmers or is increasingly grown by British Sugar themselves, albeit using contractors.
Economically the sugar beet factory had a huge impact on the area. It required resources of roads, water and power in the form of gas and electricity as well as sewage and drainage. Indeed, the seasonality of the process meant that it had to retain good electric supply and it had its own substantial generating capacity that fed surplus electricity back into the grid. Under the nationalised industry and the subsequent British Sugar it enjoyed great investment. The most visible investment being the concrete silos erected between 1963 and 1971 to increase the factory’s capacity and ensure that the production season, referred to locally as “the campaign” was not extended unnecessarily. As a child my sense of direction was poor and it was a standing joke that I only knew where Spalding was once I could see the sugar beet silos, such was their dominance on the flat skyline.
The significance of the sugar beet factory reached far beyond Spalding. Sugar beet harvesting stimulated a good number of engineering firms to develop harvesting and handling equipment, such as Garfords at Market Deeping, Standens in Ely, and Terry Johnson (elevators) in Holbeach, to name but a few. In addition were the haulage companies, machinery wholesalers, agricultural engineers, agronomists and chemical trades. This is without considering the direct employees of the factories and the farmers and contractors. That it is still important today, despite the nearest factories being at Newark or in Norfolk, is undoubted. However, the benefits are now favouring largeness for whilst sugar beet uses more employees than some crops, it is substantially less labour intensive than it used to be. Into the 1980’s you would still see some two row harvesters used by smaller farmers (or larger ones in an exceptionally wet year) and sugar beet loaded by hand onto small trailers to be spilled onto the highway as the road cambered, although these were rapidly dying out.
In my opinion the post-war period up to the end of the twentieth century was one of massive over-production influenced by global politics and changing economies. America and Britain had a huge fear that as colonial interests dissolved sugar production could fall into the hands of communism. Germany had weaponised the industrial production of sugar in the First World War and Western democracies were addicted to sugar. This cold-war fear did carry some legitimacy and is even referred to by Ian Flemming in his James Bond novel Live and Let Die. The other driver was a wish in the growing European Union to shake off the post War American dominance in favour of Franco-German production including food and sugar with subsidies and import quotas. Driven by such funding the industry became more and more efficient and successful with increased yields, improved sugar content, and more automation. Britain itself had a peculiar difficulty in that it also had the legacy of the production quota established in the 1930’s that post Brexit still sees a two thirds dominance by Tate & Lyle. Despite its British origins in 2010 Tate & Lyle became owned by American Sugar Refining. Thus America retains dominance.
More locally the sugar beet factory had a significant impact on local businesses. Sugar beet cheques were open, meaning that they were not “crossed” and could be endorsed by the payee and handed over to third parties for payment. As such, many local businesses treated sugar beet cheques as cash with them being used to pay tradesmen, buy new televisions, washing machines and cars. This practise still existed, but was dying off into the 1980’s and was ended by the Cheques Act 1992 changing the rights and ability to transfer a cheque. The most number of endorsements I have seen on a sugar beet cheque are five, effectively meaning it had passed through up to six hands as payment. The seasonal nature of the sugar beet campaign also created a particular niche seasonal work force. There were a whole group of local people that would only work for the campaign working as many hours as possible for about five months. Once they had finished the campaign they would go on a spending splurge with long foreign holidays, new cars, new kitchens and ,to my father’s benefit, new televisions. This was an annual boom to local businesses. Some would continue to work in summer agricultural or horticultural work. A significant number were keen to spend as much as possible that their savings were reduced to such a level that they could claim housing benefit until the next campaign began, and thus they ‘worked the system’.
The Spalding sugar beet factory closed in 1989 and the iconic silos were demolished by explosion on Ash Wednesday 1996. The factory site is in 2024 home to a gas-powered electric power station.
I miss the distinctive smell of the sugar beet factory on a foggy morning. The hazard of sugar beet falling off a trailer is now a rarity along with the muddy trails left by tractors at the two bridges roundabout in Spalding. All these were lost with the wonderful sweet taste of Mr. Bertilasso’s sugar beet wine. [v]
[i] This increase in production supplied the UK until it joined the European Economic Community in the 1970’s and Australia was dropped overnight with devastating consequences for Australian sugar farmers.
[ii] Cupar Fife, Ely, Felstead, Nottingham, Selby, Peterborough, Brigg, Kings Lynn, Bardney, Ipswich, Kidderminster, Allscott, York, Telford, Spalding are all sites of old sugar beet factories illustrating how widespread the industry was primarily down the East coast of Britain.
[iii] Hansard – Lord Olivier’s report to Parliament 26th November 1930 vol 79 cc 329-58
[iv] Spalding Guardian 15th November 1930
[v] Mr. Bertilasso was of Italian origin and made the most wonderful wine that he generously gave away. He worked at the sugar beet factory and I have fond memories of tasting his sugar beet wine which can be compared in flavour to English birch sap wine.
I didn’t realise the towers had only been there a relatively short time. I remember going to the club for events when I was young.